233 The wealthy hire shepherds from among the middle class and poor. They pasture collectively;
[465] if one hires out as shepherd the others help him . . . . A shepherd receives from his master clothing, food, and three or four sheep in payment. A good horse shepherd will receive in addition to food and clothes, a horse. 1

According to Tlenshiev a young shepherd might get seven woolen cloaks or seven lambs for a year's work while a skilled and experienced worker might receive anywhere from one to ten horses. The regular period of employment was for one year. At the end of that time the herdsman might return to his own uru, go to work for another employer, or continue in his job for another year.

The hired herdsmen, Tlenshiev said, were called malcь from mal (cattle), though in addition to tending the herds they performed any other necessary heavy work about their employer's kibitka. There were several varieties of malcь according to the kind of animal they tended. Sheep herders (qojcь) followed their flocks on foot while cow herds (sьjьrcь) either rode a cow or went afoot. The horse herders (çьlqьcь) were from necessity obliged to
[342] have a mount, but, said Tlenshiev, usually had a broken-down nag assigned to them. The herdsmen and their families did not live in a true kibitka (kyiz yj) but in a rough shelter, called qos or kyrke, formed by an old felt or reed mat supported by three poles.[29] Tlenshiev emphasized the fact that the malcь together with their wives and children never lived in real kibitkas, except insofar as the kyrke might itself be considered a small kibitka. This would indicate that only a part, perhaps not more than half, of the Kazak customarily dwelt in the kibitka as it is usually described.

565 These details were of course provided by Tlenshiev in an enthusiastic effort to indicate
511 to me the severe exploitation to which the lower class of Kazak were subjected by their masters and must be discounted accordingly. They gain however a degree of confirmation from other sources. Rudenko[31] describes the poorer people as living in the kyrke and Zaleskie,[32] after describing a form of dwelling of the poor very similar to a kyrke, adds: "Les plus pauvre passent, en été, la nuit dans la steppe, à la belle étoile, et l'hiver, cherchent un abri dans les kibitka des riches; ils sont . . . considérés sinon avec mépris, au moins avec dédain." Again,[33] in confirmation of the fact that the poor followed the animals on foot, the same author writes, "Les pauvres . . . vont à pied en chassant les troupeaux devant eux . . . ."

233 Among wealthy Kazak the animals were not driven home at night,[34] as was customary
565 among the owners of smaller herds,[35] but were left in the charge of herdsmen on the pastures where there was more grass.[36] A small number of cattle necessary for milking were kept near the kibitkas. Only the wealthy had camels.[37]

[29] The distinction between the qos and kyrke was that the latter had a small smoke vent.
[31] *Ocherk Byta . . . Kazakov*, 32.
[32] Zaleskie, *La Vie des steppes*, 9.
[33] *Idem*, 10.
[34] Kuftin, *Kirgiz-Kazaki*, 24.
[35] Atkinson, *Oriental and Western Siberia*, 228.
[36] Grodekov, *Kirgizy i Karakirgizy*, 110.
[37] Rudenko, *Ocherk Byta . . . Kazakov*, 14.

1 [Rudenko in Ocherk Byta . . . Kazakov, 20. -- Analyst]

2: Hudson E-4, 5 (1936) 1938 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

The general practice of allotting to a man's sons, as they came of age, their share of the inheritance was an important factor in facilitating the formation of new uru groups. This process has been mentioned in the discussion of the nature of the uru and will be evident again in a consideration of other Turkic and Mongol peoples.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR

The wealthy patron and the poor relative frequently appear in the relation of creditor and debtor. The importance of this relation is reflected in the special terminology for loans of different kinds of animals; savɓn, for example, means the loan of a milch cow, and majɓn, the loan of a horse. Animals were frequently borrowed for the purpose of paying the bride price. Such loans were made in the presence of witnesses. Ujfalvy[84] says that one hundred percent interest was customary. According to my information interest was paid on these loans in the form of labor by the debtor for the creditor in addition to repayment of the animals. Dingelstedt[85] does not specify the nature of interest but remarks that there were generous individuals who lent without interest. He adds that the site of the winter quarters was sometimes offered as security for the loan. My informants said that in default of payment the debtor was obliged to work for his creditor without payment until the value of the loan had been covered at the rate of about seven sheep a year, which was the approximate wage of a shepherd.

There is, apparently at least, a difficulty here. Under the patriarchal relationship existing between the wealthy herd owners and their poor relatives, the latter might be already serving his patron as shepherd and general handyman without wages for his living only. How then would he repay the debt? The only information I could get was that the unfortunate individual simply kept on working as before.

There seems to be a very important point involved here, much more so than the dilemma of the unfortunate defaulter, namely the nature of the relationship between patron and client and the significance of the bonds of kinship in the uru. There are apparently two tendencies involved, or two points of view from which the relationship can be considered. Regarded as a benevolent patron and protector, the wealthy man gave aid, protection and support to his poorer relatives in recognition of the claims of kinship and as a natural obligation of his position in return for the services of his dependents as herdsmen in times of peace and armed retainers in war. No exact mechanical balancing of accounts on behalf of each was possible. On the other hand the wealthy herd owners may be regarded as harsh exploiters of the poor, intent only on exacting from them as much as possible in the form of service and labor, and giving in return as little as possible.

Tlenshiev was clearly aware of these divergent points of view. After talking about the loan of cows, horses or sheep as might be needed by the rich to their dependents, he grew suddenly thoughtful and then explained that although these facts had been used by "coun-

[84] Ujfalvy de Mezö-Kövesd, *Expédition scientifique*, 2: 113.
[85] Dingelstedt, *Le Droit coutumier*, 216.

/118/ CHAPTER VIII.

Hiring out. - An object found. - Objects entrusted for safe-keeping. - Gifts. - Trade. - Debts. - The value of animals by customary law. - The transport of cargo on camels.

241 Among the agriculturalists there is a form of hiring of workers
465 on shares. Well-to-do people give the worker sustenance and seeds and lend him their livestock, land and tools during the field work. The worker receives a remuneration from the harvest, depending on circumstances, of one-fourth to one-half. If there is no harvest, there is no remuneration.

463 In addition the hiring of servants (yalchi) exists, for 1) pastur-
465 ing livestock (the shepherd is called kanchi, or specifically, koychi for sheep, dzhilkychi for a drove of horses, kelakhtachi for geldings), 2) for field labor (eginchi), 3) for domestic services (dzhigit, khyzmekter) and 4) for official errands (yasaul) for the volost official, the bii, etc. These servants or workers are hired by the year, or, rarely, by the month or the day. The servants receive pay either in full in advance, or half in advance and the remaining half after a certain period. In case of resignation by one side, an accounting is made by days and the worker returns to the employer anything extra he has received. The presence of witnesses when the conditions are drawn up is not obligatory.

466 The master calls his servant "balam" (my son), "adamym" (my man), or kuzim" (my eye). In accordance with this last appellation, the servant is obliged to avert losses, even though these may not be related to his specialty.

Servants are held responsible for intended (kasdan) damage which they cause. They are held responsible on a general basis for stealing from the master.

For damage and losses, resulting from neglect (bigamdiktan) and lack of watchfulness (khatadan), for example, breaking things, loss of a sheep, a servant does not pay, except in cases where the condition was made that he would pay.

/119/ A master may scold and even beat a hired servant up to three blows with a whip, with impunity. With the fourth blow the master is already considered in error (aybday), and after this the servant can complain. A servant dare not scold or beat his master under fear of being sentenced to pay an atton and to beg forgiveness.